Federalism: Tragic Compromise and Conflicts

  • Giacomo Delledonne Institute for Law, Politics and Development (Dirpolis) Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa
Keywords: Federalism, Constitutional Law, Kelsen, secession

Abstract

The internal balance of power of federal orders is a major theme in Kelsen’s constitutional thought. His theory of federal conflicts is indebted both to the achievements of his inquiries into legal theory and to his direct involvement in constitutional policy debates in the 1920s and 1930s. In so doing, he took a strong stance at the time of the Prussian coup, a major constitutional crisis in whose handling Carl Schmitt also played a significant role. In my essay I will build on Paolo Carrozza’s analysis of Kelsen’s contribution to the constitutional theory of federations. My goal is to make some points on its relevance for a proper understanding of the most recent developments in federal systems, including the aftermath of secession crises in Europe.

Received: 11 May 2019
Accepted: 21 June 2019
Published online: 31 July 2019

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Author Biography

Giacomo Delledonne, Institute for Law, Politics and Development (Dirpolis) Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa

Postdoctoral researcher in Comparative Public Law

Published
2019-07-31
How to Cite
Delledonne, Giacomo. 2019. “Federalism: Tragic Compromise and Conflicts”. Estudios De Deusto 67 (1), 83-95. https://doi.org/10.18543/ed-67(1)-2019pp83-95.
Section
Special Issue